automatic verification

Fact verification has attracted a lot of research attention recently, e.g., in journalism, marketing, and policymaking, as misinformation and disinformation online can sway one's opinion and affect one's actions. While fact-checking is a hard task in general, in many cases, false statements can be easily debunked based on analytics over tables with reliable information. Hence, table-based fact verification has recently emerged as an important and growing research area. Yet, progress has been limited due to the lack of datasets that can be used to pre-train language models (LMs) to be aware of common table operations, such as aggregating a column or comparing tuples. To bridge this gap, in this paper we introduce PASTA, a novel state-of-the-art framework for table-based fact verification via pre-training with synthesized sentence–table cloze questions. In particular, we design six types of common sentence–table cloze tasks, including Filter, Aggregation, Superlative, Comparative, Ordinal, and Unique, based on which we synthesize a large corpus consisting of 1.2 million sentence–table pairs from WikiTables. PASTA uses a recent pre-trained LM, DeBERTaV3, and further pre-trains it on our corpus. Our experimental results show that PASTA achieves new state-of-the-art performance on two table-based fact verification benchmarks: TabFact and SEM-TAB-FACTS. In particular, on the complex set of TabFact, which contains multiple operations, PASTA largely outperforms the previous state of the art by 4.7 points (85.6% vs. 80.9%), and the gap between PASTA and human performance on the small TabFact test set is narrowed to just 1.5 points (90.6% vs. 92.1%).

The task of misinformation detection has tremendous potential to make a significant contribution to society. However, current automatic fact-checking systems ignore an important aspect of fact-checking: the lack of counter-evidence. In this paper, we analyze the prevalence of counter-evidence in real-world fact-checking datasets. We find that counter-evidence is almost always present in the evidence used by human fact-checkers, but is missing in the evidence retrieved by current automatic fact-checking systems. We argue that this discrepancy is a major reason for the lack of robustness of current systems. To address this issue, we propose a new task setting that requires the system to identify the lack of counter-evidence and to abstain from making a prediction in such cases. We show that this is a challenging task for current systems, and that our proposed method can improve the robustness of fact-checking systems.

We introduce VeriStruct, a novel framework that extends AI-assisted automated verification from single functions to more complex data structure modules in Verus. VeriStruct employs a planner module to orchestrate the systematic generation of abstractions, type invariants, specifications, and proof code. To address the challenge that LLMs often misunderstand Verus' annotation syntax and verification-specific semantics, VeriStruct embeds syntax guidance within prompts and includes a repair stage to automatically correct annotation errors. In an evaluation on eleven Rust data structure modules, VeriStruct succeeds on ten of the eleven, successfully verifying 128 out of 129 functions (99.2%) in total. These results represent an important step toward the goal of automatic AI-assisted formal verification.

Complete formal verification is the only known way to guarantee that a system is free of programming errors. We present our experience in performing the formal, machine-checked verification of the seL4 microkernel from an abstract specification down to its C implementation. We assume correctness of compiler, assembly code, and hardware, and we used a unique design approach that fuses formal and operating systems techniques. To our knowledge, this is the first formal proof of functional correctness of a complete, general-purpose operating-system kernel. Functional correctness means here that the implementation always strictly follows our high-level abstract specification of kernel behaviour. This encompasses traditional design and implementation safety properties such as the kernel will never crash, and it will never perform an unsafe operation. It also proves much more: we can predict precisely how the kernel will behave in every possible situation. seL4, a third-generation microkernel of L4 provenance, comprises 8,700 lines of C code and 600 lines of assembler. Its performance is comparable to other high-performance L4 kernels.