Machine Unlearning

Lucas BourtouleVarun ChandrasekaranChristopher A. Choquette-ChooHengrui JiaAdelin TraversBaiwu ZhangDavid LieNicolas Papernot

article2019IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy1,632 citations

Introduces the SISA framework to efficiently remove user data from trained machine learning models by strategically partitioning datasets and saving intermediate model states, drastically cutting the computational cost of complete retraining to support practical data deletion rights.

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Modern privacy regulations, such as the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation and the California Consumer Privacy Act, legally mandate a "right to be forgotten," requiring organizations to completely erase personal data upon request. Standard machine learning models, especially deep neural networks, inherently memorize training data, leaving organizations vulnerable to privacy attacks if sensitive information remains embedded in model parameters. Provably removing a user's data requires "machine unlearning," ensuring the final model is statistically indistinguishable from a model never trained on that data. Traditionally, this demands retraining entire models from scratch, which creates prohibitive computational costs and operational delays for large-scale production pipelines.

The article introduces and evaluates "SISA training" (Sharded, Isolated, Sliced, and Aggregated), a practical framework designed to dramatically accelerate machine unlearning for stateful learning algorithms like deep neural networks without sacrificing strong, verifiable privacy guarantees.

The framework partitions a training dataset into multiple disjoint, isolated shards and trains separate constituent sub-models on each shard without exchanging parameter updates. Each shard is further divided into incremental slices, with model parameter checkpoints saved sequentially after training on each additional slice. When an unlearning request arrives, only the sub-model containing the target data point must be retrained, beginning directly from the last checkpoint saved before the target data slice was introduced. The outputs of all sub-models are combined during inference via aggregation strategies such as majority voting or prediction vector averaging. The authors evaluate this approach analytically and empirically across simple and complex datasets (including MNIST, Purchase, SVHN, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet) under both sequential and batched deletion scenarios, comparing it against naive retraining from scratch and fractional data baselines.

The evaluation reveals several core findings. First, SISA training provides substantial speed-ups over retraining from scratch: for simple tasks, it achieves a 4.63x retraining speed-up on the Purchase dataset and 2.45x on SVHN (configured with 20 shards and 50 slices) while incurring a negligible accuracy degradation of less than 2 percentage points. Second, the computational speed-up over the baseline is maintained as long as the number of deletion requests remains below three times the number of shards, meaning it operates effectively in realistic request regimes. Third, for complex tasks like ImageNet classification, pure sharding degrades top-5 accuracy by roughly 12 to 19.5 percentage points because sub-models lack sufficient training examples per class; however, applying transfer learning from pre-trained base models recovers this gap, reducing the accuracy loss to under 1 percentage point for top-5 accuracy while preserving retraining speed-ups. Finally, if an organization has prior knowledge of user deletion distributions across jurisdictions, distribution-aware sharding further reduces the expected volume of data requiring retraining with minimal impact on aggregate predictive performance.

These findings demonstrate that organizations can achieve strict, certifiable compliance with data erasure laws at a fraction of standard retraining costs. Rather than maintaining massive, monolithic models that require complete recomputation upon every deletion request, organizations can deploy isolated sub-models to trade modest additional storage for significant computational efficiency and operational scalability. While slicing requires additional disk storage to save intermediate parameter states, this trade-off is highly cost-effective given the comparatively low cost of storage relative to graphics processor compute time.

Organizations handling personal data in machine learning pipelines should adopt SISA training to satisfy data governance and legal erasure requirements. For complex models, engineering teams should combine SISA partitioning with transfer learning and prediction vector aggregation to mitigate potential accuracy loss. When operating across international regions with disparate privacy request rates, teams should implement distribution-aware sharding to group high-probability deletion requests into smaller, dedicated shards.

Confidence in these findings is high for standard iterative gradient descent models, though certain boundary conditions apply. Slicing benefits are restricted to stateful algorithms and do not apply to greedy non-stateful algorithms like decision trees. Furthermore, if the volume of simultaneous unlearning requests vastly exceeds the number of shards, the computational performance of SISA training naturally degrades back to that of full retraining from scratch.

  • Paper: Membership Inference Attacks Against Machine Learning Models, Reza Shokri et al. (2016). This seminal paper introduces membership inference attacks, establishing the core privacy risk of model memorization that machine unlearning seeks to mitigate.
  • Paper: A Closer Look at Memorization in Deep Networks, Devansh Arpit et al. (2017). This work analyzes how deep neural networks prioritize patterns versus memorizing individual training examples, providing foundational context on why data influence persists in trained weights.
  • Paper: Deep Learning with Differential Privacy, Martín Abadi et al. (2016). This foundational paper develops differentially private stochastic gradient descent to bound the influence of individual training points, serving as a primary theoretical baseline for data-privacy guarantees in machine learning.
  • Paper: Exploiting Unintended Feature Leakage in Collaborative Learning, Luca Melis et al. (2018). This study demonstrates how intermediate training updates leak specific training samples and unintended features, underscoring the necessity of strict data partitioning and unlearning protocols.
  • Paper: Extracting Training Data from Large Language Models, Nicholas Carlini et al. (2020). This paper demonstrates practical verbatim training data extraction from large language models, illustrating the high-stakes memorization vulnerabilities that downstream machine unlearning methods must confront.
Cover for Machine Unlearning

Abstract

Once users have shared their data online, it is generally difficult for them to revoke access and ask for the data to be deleted. Machine learning (ML) exacerbates this problem because any model trained with said data may have memorized it, putting users at risk of a successful privacy attack exposing their information. Yet, having models unlearn is notoriously difficult. We introduce SISA training, a framework that expedites the unlearning process by strategically limiting the influence of a data point in the training procedure. While our framework is applicable to any learning algorithm, it is designed to achieve the largest improvements for stateful algorithms like stochastic gradient descent for deep neural networks. SISA training reduces the computational overhead associated with unlearning, even in the worst-case setting where unlearning requests are made uniformly across the training set. In some cases, the service provider may have a prior on the distribution of unlearning requests that will be issued by users. We may take this prior into account to partition and order data accordingly, and further decrease overhead from unlearning. Our evaluation spans several datasets from different domains, with corresponding motivations for unlearning. Under no distributional assumptions, for simple learning tasks, we observe that SISA training improves time to unlearn points from the Purchase dataset by 4.63x, and 2.45x for the SVHN dataset, over retraining from scratch. SISA training also provides a speed-up of 1.36x in retraining for complex learning tasks such as ImageNet classification; aided by transfer learning, this results in a small degradation in accuracy. Our work contributes to practical data governance in machine unlearning.

Table of Contents

  • I Introduction
  • II Background on Machine learning
  • III Defining Unlearning
  • III-A Why is Unlearning Challenging?
  • III-B Formalizing the Problem of Unlearning
  • III-C Goals of Unlearning
  • III-D Strawman Solutions
  • IV The SISA training Approach
  • IV-A The SISA training Approach to Training
  • IV-B Techniques
  • IV-C Challenges
  • IV-C1 Weak Learners
  • IV-C2 Hyperparameter Search
  • V Measuring Time
  • V-A Measuring time analytically
  • V-B Measuring Time for Sharding
  • V-C Measuring Time for Slicing
  • VI Implementation Details
  • VI-A Datasets
  • VI-B Models & Experimental Setup
  • VII Evaluation
  • VII-A The Big Picture
  • VII-A1 Impact of Sharding
  • VII-A2 Impact of Slicing
  • VII-A3 Combination of Sharding and Slicing
  • VII-B Understanding the Regime
  • VII-C Bridging the Accuracy Gap
  • VIII Distributional Knowledge
  • VIII-A Realistic Scenario
  • VIII-B Distribution-Aware Sharding
  • IX Discussion
  • X Conclusions
  • References
  • -A Simulation of SISA training Time Analysis
  • -B Individual Contributions due to Slicing and Sharding
  • -C Costs Associated With Storage
  • -D Sequential Time Analysis of Sharding
  • -E Batched Time Analysis of Sharding
  • -F Sequential Time Analysis of Slicing
  • -G Moments of the Minimum of Draws from a Uniform Distribution
  • -H Batched Time Analysis of Slicing
  • -I Lone Shard Baseline Time Analysis
  • -I1 Sequential Setting
  • -I2 Batched Setting
  • -J Impact of aggregation strategy
  • -K Impact of number of samples per class on learnability

Knowls

  1. Knowl 1 — Exact Machine Unlearning Guarantee

    definition

    Let D={di:i∈U}\mathcal{D} = \{d_i : i \in \mathcal{U}\} denote a training dataset collected from a user population U\mathcal{U}. Let D′=D∪{du}\mathcal{D}' = \mathcal{D} \cup \{d_u\}, where dud_u represents data associated with a revoking user uu.

    Let DM\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}} denote the probability distribution of models produced by an unlearning mechanism M\mathcal{M} when trained on D′\mathcal{D}' and subsequently subjected to an unlearning request for dud_u.

    Let Dreal\mathcal{D}_{\text{real}} denote the probability distribution of models produced by training directly on D\mathcal{D} using M\mathcal{M} without dud_u ever being present.

    The mechanism M\mathcal{M} facilitates exact unlearning if and only if: DM=Dreal\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}} = \mathcal{D}_{\text{real}}

    This definition accounts for stochasticity in training: two trained models having differing parameter weights does not imply different training sets, provided they are drawn from the identical hypothesis distribution that training on D\mathcal{D} produces. Furthermore, it strictly requires zero residual contribution from dud_u, distinguishing unlearning from differential privacy, which permits bounded non-zero contributions ε>0\varepsilon > 0.

  2. Knowl 2 — SISA Training Framework

    model/method

    SISA (Sharded, Isolated, Sliced, Aggregated) training is an unlearning framework designed for stateful iterative algorithms such as stochastic gradient descent for deep neural networks:

    1. Sharding: The training set D\mathcal{D} of size NN is partitioned into SS disjoint shards D1,…,DS\mathcal{D}_1, \dots, \mathcal{D}_S such that ⋂k=1SDk=∅\bigcap_{k=1}^S \mathcal{D}_k = \emptyset and ⋃k=1SDk=D\bigcup_{k=1}^S \mathcal{D}_k = \mathcal{D}.

    2. Isolation: A constituent model MkM_k is trained on each shard Dk\mathcal{D}_k completely in isolation. No gradients, activations, or parameter updates are communicated across constituents, strictly confining the influence of any data point du∈Dkd_u \in \mathcal{D}_k to model MkM_k.

    3. Slicing: Each shard Dk\mathcal{D}_k is further partitioned into RR disjoint slices Dk,1,…,Dk,R\mathcal{D}_{k,1}, \dots, \mathcal{D}_{k,R}. Training proceeds incrementally: step 1 trains Mk,1M_{k,1} on Dk,1\mathcal{D}_{k,1} from random initialization; step r∈{2,…,R}r \in \{2, \dots, R\} initializes from the saved checkpoint of Mk,r−1M_{k,r-1} and trains on ⋃i=1rDk,i\bigcup_{i=1}^r \mathcal{D}_{k,i}, saving checkpoints before introducing each subsequent slice.

    4. Unlearning: When a point du∈Dk,rd_u \in \mathcal{D}_{k,r} is revoked, only constituent MkM_k is retrained. Retraining begins directly from the parameter checkpoint saved at the end of slice r−1r-1, using updated slice Dk,r∖{du}\mathcal{D}_{k,r} \setminus \{d_u\} and continuing through slice RR.

    5. Aggregation: At inference time, inputs are evaluated across all SS constituent models, and their predictions are aggregated (via majority voting or prediction vector averaging).

  3. Knowl 3 — Epoch Recalibration for Sliced Model Training

    equation

    To equalize computational training time between standard training on a shard of size D=N/SD = N/S for e′e' epochs and sliced training with RR equal-sized slices, the total number of epochs e=∑i=1Reie = \sum_{i=1}^R e_i across all slices is adjusted.

    Assuming each incremental slicing step i∈{1,…,R}i \in \{1, \dots, R\} trains on iD/Ri D / R samples for ei=e/Re_i = e / R epochs, equating the total sample presentations e′De' D to the sliced sample presentations yields: e′D=∑i=1ReiiDR=eDR2∑i=1Ri=eDR2R(R+1)2=R+12ReDe' D = \sum_{i=1}^R e_i \frac{i D}{R} = \frac{e D}{R^2} \sum_{i=1}^R i = \frac{e D}{R^2} \frac{R(R+1)}{2} = \frac{R+1}{2R} e D

    Solving for ee yields the recalibration formula: e=2RR+1e′e = \frac{2R}{R + 1} e' where e′e' is the baseline number of epochs without slicing, RR is the number of slices per shard, and ee is the cumulative number of epochs allocated across the RR slicing stages.

  4. Knowl 4 — Expected Sample Retraining Cost of Data Sharding

    theoretical result

    Let a dataset of NN points be partitioned uniformly into SS shards. Let unlearning requests arrive uniformly at random across the dataset. Retraining cost CC represents the total number of sample passes required during retraining.

    1. Sequential Setting (KK requests processed one by one): Accounting for the reduction in shard sizes as points are deleted, the expected total retraining cost across KK unlearning requests is: E[C]=(NS+12S−1)K−K22S\mathbb{E}[C] = \left(\frac{N}{S} + \frac{1}{2S} - 1\right) K - \frac{K^2}{2S} When K≪NK \ll N and N/S≫1N/S \gg 1, this cost is bounded above by NSK\frac{N}{S} K, providing an expected S×S\times speed-up over full dataset retraining for a single request (K=1K=1).

    2. Batched Setting (KK requests processed in a single batch): Let hj∈{0,1}h_j \in \{0, 1\} indicate whether shard j∈{1,…,S}j \in \{1, \dots, S\} contains at least one deletion request, with P(hj=0)=(1−1/S)KP(h_j = 0) = (1 - 1/S)^K, and let uj∼Binomial(K,1/S)u_j \sim \text{Binomial}(K, 1/S) denote the number of deletions in shard jj. The expected total retraining cost across all affected shards is: E[C]=N(1−(1−1S)K)−K\mathbb{E}[C] = N \left(1 - \left(1 - \frac{1}{S}\right)^K\right) - K Asymptotically, for K→0K \to 0, E[C]∼N(1−exp⁡(−Kτ))\mathbb{E}[C] \sim N \left(1 - \exp\left(-\frac{K}{\tau}\right)\right) where τ=(−ln⁡(1−1/S))−1\tau = \left(-\ln(1 - 1/S)\right)^{-1}, and for K→∞K \to \infty, E[C]→N−K\mathbb{E}[C] \to N - K.

  5. Knowl 5 — Expected Sample Retraining Cost of Slicing

    theoretical result

    Let a shard of size DD be divided into RR uniform slices, calibrated to baseline training epochs e′e'. Retraining restarts from slice index r∈{1,…,R}r \in \{1, \dots, R\}, the earliest slice containing an unlearned point.

    1. Sequential Setting (K=1K=1 request): Assuming the deletion request hits slice index r∼Uniform({1,…,R})r \sim \text{Uniform}(\{1, \dots, R\}): E[C]=e′D(23+13R)\mathbb{E}[C] = e' D \left(\frac{2}{3} + \frac{1}{3R}\right) where CC is the number of sample-epoch presentations during retraining. For R=1R=1, E[C]=e′D\mathbb{E}[C] = e' D (no speed-up). As R→∞R \to \infty, E[C]→23e′D\mathbb{E}[C] \to \frac{2}{3} e' D, giving a maximum asymptotic speed-up of 1.5×1.5\times from slicing alone. Combined with SS shards, the single-request best-case speed-up is S(R+1)2×\frac{S(R+1)}{2}\times.

    2. Batched Setting (KK requests): Retraining restarts from slice index rmin⁡=min⁡i∈{1,…,K}rir_{\min} = \min_{i \in \{1, \dots, K\}} r_i, where ri∼Uniform({1,…,R})r_i \sim \text{Uniform}(\{1, \dots, R\}) i.i.d. The expected cost is: E[C]=2e′DR(R+1)(R(R+1)2−12(1+2(R−1)K+1(K+1)+RK+2−K+RK+1))\mathbb{E}[C] = \frac{2 e' D}{R(R+1)} \left( \frac{R(R+1)}{2} - \frac{1}{2} \left( 1 + \frac{2(R-1)}{K+1} \frac{(K+1)+R}{K+2} - \frac{K+R}{K+1} \right) \right) For K≪RK \ll R, slicing achieves a significant speed-up, decreasing with 1/K21/K^2 as K→0K \to 0. When K≫RK \gg R, E[C]∼e′D\mathbb{E}[C] \sim e' D, matching unsliced retraining without degradation.

  6. Knowl 6 — Distribution-Aware Data Sharding

    algorithm

    When individual erasure probabilities p(u)p(u) are known a priori, distribution-aware sharding aggregates points with high deletion probabilities into fewer, smaller shards to minimize the expected retraining workload.

    Input: Dataset D\mathcal{D}, threshold constant C≤1C \le 1, per-user erasure probabilities {p(u):u∈U}\{p(u) : u \in \mathcal{U}\}
    Output: Partition of shards D0,D1,…,Dm\mathcal{D}_0, \mathcal{D}_1, \dots, \mathcal{D}_m
    procedure ShardData(D\mathcal{D}, CC)
        sort {du}u=1∣D∣\{d_u\}_{u=1}^{|\mathcal{D}|} in ascending order by p(u)p(u)
        i←0i \leftarrow 0
        Di←∅\mathcal{D}_i \leftarrow \emptyset
        for each du∈Dd_u \in \mathcal{D} in sorted order do
            Di←Di∪{du}\mathcal{D}_i \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_i \cup \{d_u\}
            compute expected unlearning requests E[χi]←∑v:dv∈Dip(v)\mathbb{E}[\chi_i] \leftarrow \sum_{v: d_v \in \mathcal{D}_i} p(v)
            if E[χi]≥C\mathbb{E}[\chi_i] \ge C then
                Di←Di∖{du}\mathcal{D}_i \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_i \setminus \{d_u\}
                i←i+1i \leftarrow i + 1
                Di←{du}\mathcal{D}_i \leftarrow \{d_u\}
            end if
        end for
        return D0,…,Di\mathcal{D}_0, \dots, \mathcal{D}_i
    end procedure

    The sum of independent Bernoulli erasure trials χi\chi_i in shard Di\mathcal{D}_i follows a Poisson binomial distribution with expectation E[χi]=∑u:du∈Dip(u)\mathbb{E}[\chi_i] = \sum_{u: d_u \in \mathcal{D}_i} p(u). By enforcing E[χi]<C\mathbb{E}[\chi_i] < C with C≤1C \le 1, the procedure ensures that large shards containing privacy-insensitive data have a low probability of requiring retraining, while unlearning events concentrate in a few small shards.

  7. Knowl 7 — SISA Unlearning Efficiency on Simple Classification Tasks

    empirical result

    Under uniform unlearning request distributions, SISA training was evaluated on three simple classification benchmarks: MNIST (28×2828 \times 28 grayscale images, 10 classes, 60,000 samples, 2 convolutional + 2 fully connected layers), Purchase (600 features, 2 classes, 250,000 samples, 2 fully connected layers), and SVHN (32×32×332 \times 32 \times 3 images, 10 classes, 604,833 samples, Wide ResNet-1-1).

    Using a configuration of S=20S=20 shards and R=50R=50 slices in the batch setting:

    • On the Purchase dataset, SISA achieved a 4.63×4.63\times speed-up in retraining time compared to full retraining from scratch for a batch of K=8K=8 unlearning requests, with less than a 2 percentage point (PP) degradation in classification accuracy.
    • On the SVHN dataset, SISA achieved a 2.45×2.45\times speed-up over full retraining for K=18K=18 unlearning requests, also maintaining accuracy within 2 PP of the full-dataset baseline.
    • Increasing the number of shards beyond S=20S=20 resulted in accuracy degradation exceeding 5 PP due to insufficient sample volume per class per shard.
  8. Knowl 8 — Mitigating Weak-Learner Degradation in Complex Tasks via Soft Aggregation and Transfer Learning

    empirical result

    For complex learning tasks with high input dimensionality and large class sets (ImageNet: 1,000 classes, 1.28M samples; Mini-ImageNet: 100 classes, 128k samples), training constituent ResNet-50 models on individual shards causes them to act as weak learners due to reduced samples per class per shard:

    • Hard Label Aggregation: Using standard majority voting on ImageNet, SISA with ResNet-50 suffered an average top-5 accuracy degradation of 16.14 percentage points (PP) and top-1 degradation of 18.76 PP compared to full-dataset training (baseline top-5: 92.87%, top-1: 76.15%), while delivering a 1.36×1.36\times retraining speed-up for K=39K=39 unlearning requests.
    • Prediction Vector Aggregation: Averaging post-softmax confidence vectors across constituents instead of hard label votes improved accuracy on ImageNet by an average of 1.68 PP top-1 and 4.37 PP top-5 (lowering top-5 degradation to 11.77 PP).
    • Transfer Learning: Pretraining ResNet-50 on ImageNet and applying SISA fine-tuning on CIFAR-100 (32×32×332 \times 32 \times 3, 100 classes, 60,000 samples) across S=10S=10 shards reduced top-1 accuracy degradation to ∼4\sim 4 PP and top-5 accuracy degradation to <1< 1 PP relative to the S=1S=1 baseline, preserving unlearning speed-up without requiring heterogeneous architectures or per-shard hyperparameter tuning.
  9. Knowl 9 — Retraining Point Reductions via Distribution-Aware Sharding Under Multi-Jurisdiction Request Rates

    empirical result

    Distribution-aware sharding was evaluated in a multi-jurisdiction setup modeling GDPR data erasure request rates across N=3N=3 countries:

    • Country c1c_1: 77.17%77.17\% of total data ∣D∣|D|, erasure probability pc1=3×10−6p_{c_1} = 3 \times 10^{-6}.
    • Country c2c_2: 10.01%10.01\% of total data ∣D∣|D|, erasure probability pc2=3×10−5p_{c_2} = 3 \times 10^{-5}.
    • Country c3c_3: 12.82%12.82\% of total data ∣D∣|D|, erasure probability pc3=6×10−6p_{c_3} = 6 \times 10^{-6}.

    When applied to the SVHN dataset with threshold C=1C=1, the algorithm generated 19 unequal shards. Compared to uniform sharding:

    • Distribution-aware sharding significantly reduced the expected number of samples requiring retraining as the number of unlearning requests increased from 1 to 20, because high-erasure users were concentrated into smaller shards.
    • The ensemble achieved an aggregate test accuracy of 94.4%94.4\% in the evaluated request regime, compared to 95.7%95.7\% for uniform sharding, trading 1.3 percentage points of accuracy for substantial computational unlearning savings.
  10. Knowl 10 — Operational Regime Bounds for SISA Unlearning Benefits

    limitation

    SISA training provides computational speed-ups over naive retraining from scratch only within bounded regimes of unlearning request volume:

    1. Sharding Batch Bound: Retraining speed-up from sharding exists only when the batch size of unlearning requests KK satisfies K<3SK < 3S, where SS is the number of shards. When K≥3SK \ge 3S, the probability that all shards contain at least one affected sample approaches 1, causing retraining cost to converge to that of retraining from scratch.

    2. Dataset Fraction Thresholds:

      • For sharding (S=20S=20), speed-ups are maintained only when unlearning requests represent less than 0.075%0.075\% of the total dataset size.
      • For slicing (S=20,R=50S=20, R=50), speed-ups are maintained only when unlearning requests represent less than 0.003%0.003\% of the total dataset size, as higher request counts frequently invalidate the earliest slices and necessitate retraining the entire shard.

    When unlearning request rates exceed these thresholds, SISA computational performance gracefully degrades to match full-dataset retraining without imposing additional asymptotic overhead.

Coverage note — No substantial contributed material was omitted; the knowls cover the exact unlearning definition, the SISA framework and its analytical cost formulations, the distribution-aware sharding algorithm, empirical evaluations across simple and complex datasets, transfer learning mitigations, and operating regime limitations.

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Citation

MLA
Bourtoule, L., et al. “Machine Unlearning”. arXiv, 2019, http://arxiv.org/abs/1912.03817v3.
APA
Bourtoule, L., Chandrasekaran, V., Choquette-Choo, C. A., Jia, H., Travers, A., Zhang, B., Lie, D., & Papernot, N. (2019). Machine Unlearning. arXiv. http://arxiv.org/abs/1912.03817v3
Chicago
Bourtoule, L., V. Chandrasekaran, C. A. Choquette-Choo, et al. 2019. “Machine Unlearning”. arXiv. http://arxiv.org/abs/1912.03817v3.
Harvard
Bourtoule, L. et al. (2019) “Machine Unlearning”, arXiv [Preprint]. Available at: http://arxiv.org/abs/1912.03817v3.
Vancouver
1. Bourtoule L, Chandrasekaran V, Choquette-Choo CA, Jia H, Travers A, Zhang B, Lie D, Papernot N (2019) Machine Unlearning. arXiv

BibTeX

@article{bourtoule2019machine,
  title = {Machine Unlearning},
  author = {Bourtoule, Lucas and Chandrasekaran, Varun and Choquette-Choo, Christopher A. and Jia, Hengrui and Travers, Adelin and Zhang, Baiwu and Lie, David and Papernot, Nicolas},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {arXiv},
  url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1912.03817v3},
  eprint = {1912.03817}
}
Metadata:arXiv

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