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GSP auctions

A generalized second-price auction is a multi-item sealed-bid auction mechanism commonly used in online advertising, where multiple ad placements are allocated to bidders based on their submitted bids. In this auction format, the highest bidder receives the most prominent placement and pays the amount submitted by the second-highest bidder, the second-highest bidder receives the next placement and pays the amount submitted by the third-highest bidder, and this rule continues sequentially down through all available slots. While it extends the pricing principle of the single-item standard second-price auction to multiple ranked items, it differs from truthful mechanisms because bidding true valuation is generally not a dominant strategy. Despite this theoretical departure from strict incentive compatibility, generalized second-price auctions remain a dominant standard in digital ad exchanges and search engine marketing due to their computational simplicity, intuitive pricing structure, and tendency to achieve stable market equilibria.

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Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords

Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords

Benjamin Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky, Michael Schwarz

OrganizationsHarvard UniversityStanford UniversityYahoo

Why you should read this

Explains the equilibrium properties and incentive structures of the generalized second-price auction mechanism that underpins modern ad exchanges.

We investigate the “generalized second-price” (GSP) auction, a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising. Although GSP looks similar to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, its properties are very different. Unlike the VCG mechanism, GSP generally does not have an equilibrium in dominant strategies, and truth-telling is not an equilibrium of GSP. To analyze the properties of GSP, we describe the generalized English auction that corresponds to GSP and show that it has a unique equilibrium. This is an ex post equilibrium, with the same payoffs to all players as the dominant strategy equilibrium of VCG. (JEL D44, L81, M37)

Added

2026-05-31